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Abstract: We investigate physical layer security design, which employs random linear network coding with opportunistic relaying
and jamming to exploit the secrecy benefit of both source and relay transmissions. The proposed scheme requires the source to
transmit artificial noise along with a confidential message. Moreover, in order to further improve the dynamical behaviour of the
network against an eavesdropping attack, aggregated power controlled transmissions with optimal power allocation strategy is
considered. The network security is accurately characterized by the probability that the eavesdropper will manage to intercept a
sufficient number of coded packets to partially or fully recover the confidential message.
1 Introduction
Device-to-device (D2D) communication has attracted enormous
attention from both academia and industry and is considered as
one of the promising technologies for achieving high spectral effi-
ciency and ultra-densification in future wireless networks (5G and
beyond) [1], [2]. However, one of the major challenges in D2D
networks is the broadcast nature of wireless medium that makes
the communication over this medium vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks, such that, any node in the coverage range of transmitting
node will be able to listen and extract information [3]. Moreover, the
efficiency of D2D communication reduces when the source and des-
tination are not in proximity. For example, the outage probability
of links connecting D2D pairs will increase if the nodes are far-
ther apart. Furthermore, some destinations may not be within the
range of transmitting devices because of transmit power constraints.
This motivates the use of cooperative relays to enhance the range of
communication and thus to improve the network efficiency [4], [5].
In this context, Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) has been
realized as one of the potential paradigms for D2D communica-
tions that not only supports cooperative communication for high
throughput and efficiency but can also provide lightweight security
in networks [6–9]. For example, RLNC contains an inherent feature
of security to prevent information leakage to eavesdropper even if
the eavesdropper overhears some of the source transmissions. More-
over, despite the use of numerous cryptographic methods, Physical
Layer Security (PLS) is emerging as one of the promising solutions
for ensuring secrecy in wireless networks [10], [11], [12]. The main
idea is to exploit the physical characteristics of wireless channels
including fading and noise to transmit an information message from
a source to a legitimate destination while keeping it confidential
from an eavesdropper. In particular, securing information with the
injection of artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper is one of the
fundamental techniques in PLS which has been widely studied in the
literature[13], [14].
There are several works studying the benefits of network coding
in a PLS framework [15], [16], [17]. For example, Khan et al. in [15]
studied the intrinsic nature of RLNC against eavesdropping attacks
and identified the advantage of optimising the number of source
transmissions based on feedback by the legitimate destination. Later
in [17], the authors proposed an RLNC based opportunistic relay-
ing and jamming framework. Sun et al. proposed fountain-coding
based cooperative jamming technique in [16]. Differently from the
previous work, this work takes into account power controlled trans-
missions of both message and interfering signals, which improves
the dynamic behaviour of the network against the eavesdropping
attack. In addition, the security advantage of a direct source-to-
destination link is exploited which is often ignored in PLS designs,
while the source is allowed to superimpose the confidential mes-
sage onto an artificial noise (AN) signal. Furthermore, optimal relay
selection for signal jamming is carried out not only when the source
signal is relayed to the destination but also when it is broadcast to
the relays. Note that, unlike [16], [18], in this work the legitimate
destination is not able to mitigate any AN and interference signals.
The main contributions are summarised as follows: (i) We inves-
tigate a physical layer security design including RLNC based oppor-
tunistic relaying and jamming, where source and relay nodes are
jointly considered with adjustable transmission power for both secu-
rity and reliability; (ii) we derive exact theoretical expressions of
the outage probabilities at both the destination and the eavesdrop-
per, and accurately characterise the network performance in terms
of the τ -intercept probability which quantifies the exact number of
data packets. Extensive simulations are conducted to validate the
accuracy of the derived expressions, and the network performance
is investigated based on the optimal power allocations.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the system model. A detailed description of the considered relay
selection techniques is provided in Section 3 and outage probability
expressions for both the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper
are derived. Exact theoretical expressions for quantifying the secrecy
of RLNC-enabled opportunistic relaying and jamming are derived
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the resource allocation model to
obtain the optimal values of power control coefficients. Results are
discussed in Section 4 and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 System Model
We consider a network with a source S, one destination D, one
eavesdropper E, and a set of N trusted relays SN = {1, . . . , N},
as shown in Fig. 1. Each node is equipped with a single antenna
and operates in half-duplex mode. All the links connecting the
nodes are assumed to be independent but not identically distributed
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the system model. Note that, j∗ represents
j∗1 in the broadcast phase and relay j∗2 in the relay phase but j∗1 can
be different to j∗2 .
(i.n.i.d) quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels, as in [19]. The chan-
nel gain between node i and j is represented as |hi,j | with variance
σ2i,j = d
−ηi,j
i,j , where di,j and ηi,j are the Euclidean distance and
the path loss exponent between the two nodes, respectively. More-
over, we assume that the transmission power of each node is limited
to P .
Before the communication process, the source S first divides the
message into K data packets. Afterwards, RLNC over some finite
field Fq [20] is employed to encode the packets into K linearly
independent coded packets, where q represents the field size. These
coded packets are then forwarded to the physical layer for further
processing. At the physical layer, the modulation and coding scheme
(MCS) converts the stream ofK coded packets into a sequence ofK
signals, represented as {xs,1, xs,2 . . . xs,K} which will be sent over
the wireless channel. The end-to-end communication is performed
in two phases: the broadcast phase and the relay phase.
During the broadcast phase, the source generates a signal that
is the superposition of xS,i and the AN signal xA,i and broad-
casts it towards D. The transmitted signal can be represented as
(
√
PasxS,i +
√
P a¯sxA,i), where as and a¯s are the power control
coefficients, such that, as ≥ a¯s and as + a¯s = 1. Meanwhile, in
order to further combat the eavesdropper’s attack and according to
the security protocol, a selected relay j∗1 operates in jamming mode,
that is, it radiates artificial interference in synchronization with the
source signal to deteriorate the eavesdropper’s channel. The signal
transmitted by j∗1 can be expressed as
√
Paj1xj∗1 ,i, where aj1 repre-
sents the power control coefficient. In order to protect the destination
from severe artificial interference, we assume aj1 ≤ as. Note that
a centralized control unit is considered for selecting an appropri-
ate relay and controlling transmission powers for each transmission,
based on the perfectly known channel state information of all the
links. Additive white Gaussian noise is assumed at each node with
zero mean and varianceN0. If we set ρ = P/N0, the received SINR
at node Z ∈ SN \ j∗1 ∪ {D,E} can be expressed as:
SINR(S)Z =
ρas|hS,Z|2
ρa¯s|hS,Z|2 + ρaj1 |hj∗1 ,Z|2 + 1
. (1)
Both the destination D and eavesdropper E demodulate and store
the correctly received coded packets for future RLNC decoding. On
the other hand, each node in SN \ j∗1 demodulates and stores the
correctly received coded packets for RLNC decoding at the end of
the phase. For simplicity and to avail the possibility of selecting j∗1
as a potential relay in the next phase, we assume that all the relays in
SN cooperate locally to exchange missing coded packets. Thus after
collecting K linearly independent coded packets, at the end of this
Table 1 Key parameters of the system model
Notation Description
K Number of data packets.
N Number of relay nodes.
SN Set of N trusted relay nodes.
P Total transmit power of a node.
N0 Variance of the additive white Gaussian noise
hi,j Fading coefficient of the channel between
nodes i and j.
γi,j Instantaneous SNR of the link between nodes
i and j.
λi,j The inverse of the average SNR of the link between
nodes i and j.
εij Outage probability of the link between nodes
i and j.
n∗ Selected relay.
j∗1 Selected jammer during the broadcast phase.
j∗2 Selected jammer during the relay phase.
nT Number of transmitted coded packets.
ηr Transmissions during the relay phase.
NT Maximum permitted number of transmissions.
phase, each relay in SN employs RLNC decoding and successfully
retrieves the original data packets.
During the relay phase and according to the protocol, two selected
relays transmit towards D and E. The first relay n∗ generates a coded
packet using RLNC over the same finite field Fq , and forwards to
the destination D. At the same time, the second relay j∗2 generates
artificial interference for the same reason as that for j∗1 . The signal
transmitted by both n∗ and j∗2 can be expressed as
√
Parxn∗,i and√
Paj2xj∗2 ,i, respectively, where ar and aj2 are power control coef-
ficients such that aj2 ≤ ar and ar + aj2 = 1. The received SINR at
node Z ∈ {D,E} is:
SINR
(R)
Z =
ρar|hn∗,Z|2
ρaj2 |hj∗2 ,Z|2 + 1
. (2)
This process is repeated up to ηr times, and thus up to ηr coded
packets are transmitted during this phase; each time, the appropriate
relays n∗ and j∗2 are selected from SN , depending on the instanta-
neous channel conditions. Both the destination D and eavesdropper
E are needed to collect at least K linearly independent coded pack-
ets in order to reconstruct the source message. If the destination
recovers the message before the set deadline of NT = K + ηr total
transmissions in both phases, it sends a notification to the control
unit to terminate the relay selection and packet transmission pro-
cess. For convenience, the key parameters of the system model are
summarized in Table 1.
3 Relay Selection and Outage Probabilities
This section presents the proposed relay selection schemes, and eval-
uates their performance in terms of outage probabilities at both
the destination D and the eavesdropper E. For notational conve-
nience, let us define γi,j = ρ|hi,j |2 as the instantaneous SNR of
the link between node i and j The probability density function
of γi,j follows the exponential distribution, that is: fγi,j (x) =
λi,j exp(−xλi,j). If we define rate parameter λi,j = 1/E
{
γi,j
}
with E{.} as the expectation operation, the cumulative distribution
function of γi,j is equal to:
Pr(γi,j ≤ γˆ) = 1− e−γˆλi,j . (3)
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Opportunistic jammer: This protocol incorporates the instanta-
neous channel quality of both relay to destination and eavesdropper
links [19]. According to this scheme, an optimal jammer j∗1 is
selected such that it generates maximum interference to the eaves-
dropper while causing least effect to the destination. Mathematically,
it can be expressed as:
j∗1 = arg max
j∈SN
(
γj,E
γj,D
)
. (4)
Using the theory of order statistics (maximum among N indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables) and taking
integrals with respect to both γj,E and γj,D [21], we can obtain:
Pr(j∗1 = j) =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
Pr
(
γi,E
γi,D
≤ x
y
)
fγj,E(x)fγj,D(y) dx dy.
(5)
Opportunistic relay and jammer: For high reliability and for low
complexity of selecting a relay-jammer pair, this protocol only takes
into account the channel quality of relay-to-destination link, and
selects a relay n∗ and jammer j∗2 , such that:
n∗ = arg max
n∈SN
γn,D. (6)
j∗2 = arg min
m∈SN\n∗
γm,D. (7)
The probability of selecting the two nodes can be obtained by
employing order statistics (maximum and minimum among N i.i.d
random variables) and taking integrals with respect to both γm,D
and γn,D [21], as follows:
Pr
[
n∗ = n, j∗2 =m
]
=
∞∫
0
γn,D∫
0
N−2∏
i 6=n,
i 6=m
Pr(y ≤ γi,D ≤ x)
fγm,D(y)fγn,D(x) dy dx.
(8)
Note that, several relay selection algorithms are available in the lit-
erature, aiming at promoting the assistance to the source as well as
interference to the eavesdropper, but this discussion is beyond the
scope of this paper.
3.1 Outage analysis
The outage event can be defined as the event when the instanta-
neous SINR drops below a predefined threshold. As shown in [22],
the physical-layer MCS can be accurately characterized by an SNR
threshold. Let us denote γˆS and γˆR as SNR thresholds for source
and relay transmissions, respectively. The outage probability for the
transmission between node i and j can be defined as:
εij = Pr(SINR
(i)
j ≤ γˆi).
3.1.1 Broadcast Phase: During this phase, the outage proba-
bility at D can be expressed as:
εSD = Pr(SINR
(S)
D ≤ γˆS)
= Pr(
asγS,D
a¯sγS,D + aj1γj∗1 ,D + 1
≤ γˆS)
= Pr(γS,D ≤ Aγj∗1 ,D +B)
(9)
where A =
γˆSaj1
as − a¯sγˆS and B =
γˆS
as − a¯sγˆS . Thus, the closed form
expression of εSD can be obtained by exploiting the law of total
probability [23] over the joint probability of selecting j∗1 and the
outage event at D, as follows:
εSD =
N−1∑
j=1
Pr
[(
j∗1 = j
)⋂(
γS,D ≤ Aγj∗1 ,D +B
)]
. (10)
Using expression (5) and by properly setting the limits, we obtain
εSD =
N−1∑
j=1
∞∫
0
Aγj,D+B∫
0
∞∫
0
N∏
i=1
i 6=j
Pr
(
γi,E
γi,D
≤ x
y
)
fγj,E(x)fγS,D(z)fγj,D(y) dx dz dy
(11)
By employing partial fractions, the product expression can be
expanded as:
N∏
i=1
i 6=n
Pr
(
γi,E
γi,D
≤ x
y
)
= 1−
N∑
i=1
i 6=n
y
xΛi + y
∏
k/∈{n,i}
−Λk
Λi − Λk
(12)
where Λi =
λi,E
λi,D
. Thus, (13) can be re-expressed as:
εSD =
N−1∑
j=1
∞∫
0
Aγj,D+B∫
0
∞∫
0
1−
N∑
i=1
i6=n
y
xΛi + y
∏
k/∈{n,i}
−Λk
Λi − Λk
fγj,E(x)fγS,D(z)fγj,D(y) dx dz dy.
(13)
Evaluating the integrals and utilizing the relationships in [24, 25]
leads to:
εSD =
N∑
n=1
1− λn,De
−BλS,D
AλS,D + λn,D
−
N∑
j 6=n
λn,Eλn,D
Λj
[
1
α2
{
ln(
Λj
Λn
)
+
Λn
Λj
− 1}− e−BλS,D
α21
{
ln(
AλS,DΛj + λn,DΛj
λn,E
)
+
λn,E
AλS,DΛj + λn,DΛj
− 1}]
(14)
where, α = λn,D − λn,EΛj , α1 = AλS,D −
λn,E
Λj
+ λn,D. Following the
same line of thought, the outage probability at E is equal to:
εSE =
N−1∑
n=1
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
Aγn,E+B∫
0
N∏
i=1
i 6=n
Pr
(
γi,E
γi,D
≤ x
y
)
fγS,E(z)fγn,E(x)fγn,D(y)dxdzdy
In order to derive an analytical expression of εSE, we follow a sim-
ilar approach to the derivation of εSD, i.e., expansion of the product
term and evaluation of the integrals. The closed form expression of
εSE is:
εSE =
N∑
n=1
1− λn,Ee
−BλS,E
AλS,E + λn,E
−
N∑
j 6=n
λn,Eλn,D
Λj
[
1
αˆ2
{
ln(
Λj
Λn
)
+
Λn
Λj
− 1}− e−BλS,E
αˆ21
{
ln(
Λjλn,D
AλS,E + λn,E
)− 1
+
AλS,E + λn,E
Λjλn,D
}]
(15)
where αˆ = λn,D − λn,EΛj and αˆ1 = λn,D −
AλS,E+λn,E
Λj
.
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3.1.2 Relay phase: During this phase, the outage probability
at D should take into account the joint probability of selecting a pair
{n∗, j∗}, and the SINR at the destination not exceeding the SNR
threshold γˆR. Thus, by employing the law of total probability, εRD
can be expressed as:
εRD =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m 6=n
Pr
[(
n∗=n, j∗2 =m
)⋂( arγn,D
aj2γm,D+1
≤ γˆR
)]
.
(16)
Exploiting (8) and by properly setting the limits, we obtain:
εRD =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m6=n
∞∫
0
(aj2
y+1)γˆR
ar∫
y
N−2∏
i 6=n,
i6=m
Pr(y ≤ γi,D ≤ x)
fγn,D(x)fγm,D(y)dxdy
by invoking (3), we can obtain:
εRD =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m6=n
∞∫
0
(aj2
y+1)γˆR
ar∫
y
N−2∏
i 6=n,
i6=m
(e−yλi,D − e−xλi,D)
fγn,D(x)fγm,D(y)dxdy.
(17)
Using the multinomial identity [26], we can expand the expression
as:
εRD =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m6=n
N−2∑
`=0
∑
|S`|=`
∞∫
0
(aj2
y+1)γˆR
ar∫
y
(−1)`
· e(−x
∑
i∈S` λi,D−y
∑
j∈S¯` λj,D)fγn,D(x)fγm,D(y)dxdy
(18)
where, X = SN \ {n,m}, and S` ∪ S¯` = X . By solving the inte-
grals, the closed form expression can be obtained as:
εRD=
N∑
n=1
N∑
m 6=n
N−2∑
`=0
∑
|S`|=`
λn,D λm,D
(−1)`$n
{
1
$n +$m
− exp(−
1
ar
γˆR$n)
γˆR
aj2
ar
$n +$m
}
(19)
where, $n =
∑
i∈S`λn,E + λn,D, $m =
∑
j∈S¯`λm,E + λm,D,
γˆR ≥ 0.
Given that the selection procedure of relay-jammer pair {n∗, j∗2}
is independent to the channel quality of relay-to-eavesdropper links,
using the law of total probability likewise in the previous cases, the
outage probability at E can be obtained as:
εRE =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m 6=n
Pr
[
n∗=n, j∗2 =m
]
Pr
(
arγn,E
aj2γm,E+1
≤ γˆR
)
.
(20)
By employing (8), the analytical expression of εRE can be expressed
as:
εRE =
N∑
n=1
N∑
m 6=n
N−2∑
`=0
∑
|S`|=`
(
1− λm,E e
− γˆRar λn,E
aj2 γˆR
ar
λn,E + λm,E
)
(−1)`λn,Dλm,D∑
j∈S¯`λj,D + λm,D
(
1∑
i∈S`λi,D + λn,D
− 1∑N
k=1 λk,D
)
.
(21)
3.2 Secrecy Analysis
This section quantifies the network performance in terms of prob-
ability that the eavesdropper will manage to recover at least τ of
the K data packets using Gaussian elimination, which is defined
as τ -intercept probability. Note that, a receiver requires to col-
lect K linearly independent coded packets to recover the entire
message composed of K data packets. To evaluate the network per-
formance, let us assume that nT ≤ NT transmissions are carried
out during the communication process, where NT represents the
maximum permitted number of transmissions. The probability of
successfully receiving nR coded packets, and r ≤ K of them are
linearly independent is equal to:
PZr (nR, as, aj1 , ar) =
min (nR,K)∑
hB=hmin
(
K
hB
)(
nT −K
nR − hB
)
· εSZ(as, aj1 , ar)K−hBεRZ(as, aj1 , ar)nT−K−nR+hB
· (1−εSZ(as, aj1 , ar))hB(1−εRZ(as, aj1 , ar))nR−hB
· PZr−hB(K − hB, nR − hB)
(22)
where Z ∈ {D,E}, hB represents the number of packets received
during the broadcast phase with hmin = max(0, nR − nT +K),
and εij can be evaluated using the outage probability expressions
derived in Section 3. Pr−hB is the probability of obtaining r − hB
linearly independent coded packets during the relay phase, can be
obtained using [27]:
PZr−hB(K,nR) =
1
qnRK
[
nR
r − hB
]
q
r−hB−1∏
i=0
(qK − qi) (23)
where q represents the Finite field size, and
[u
ν
]
q
is the q-binomial
coefficient defined as [28, Eq. 1]. The probability that exactly τ ≤ r
data packets can be recovered after collecting r linearly independent
coded packets, is equal to [29]:
P (τ,K|r) =
(K
τ
)[K
r
]
q
K−τ∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
K − τ
j
)[
K − τ − j
r − τ − j
]
q
. (24)
In order to characterize the secrecy performance: letXD represent
the number of transmissions required by the destination D to recover
the entire message, and denote XE as the number of transmissions
needed by the eavesdropper E to recover at least τ data packets. We
can express the cumulative distribution function of bothXD andXE
as follows:
FZ(x, nT) = Pr {XZ ≤ nT}
=
nT∑
nR=x
min(nR,K)∑
r=x
r∑
i=x
PZr (nR, as, aj1 , ar)P (i,K|r)
(25)
where Z ∈ {D,E}, x is considered as τ for E and K for D. The
corresponding probability mass function is equal to:
fZ(x, nT) = Pr {XZ = nT}
= FZ(x, nT)− FZ(x, nT − 1).
(26)
The average number of transmissions required by Z to recover at
least x data packets can be expressed as:
Ex(NT) = NT −
DT−1∑
v=0
FZ(x, x+ v) (27)
where DT represents the maximum permissible number of excess
coded packet transmissions, that is, DT = NT − x. The τ -intercept
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probability that the eavesdropper will be successful in recovering
at least τ data packets from the intercepted coded packets can be
expressed as [15]:
Pint(K,NT, τ, as, aj1 , ar) =FE(τ,NT) [ 1− FD(K,NT) ]
+
NT∑
nT=K
fD(K,nT)FE(τ, nT)
(28)
The first term of Pint(K,NT, τ, as, aj1 , ar) calculates the probabil-
ity that the eavesdropper will be successful in recovering at least τ
data packets from the intercepted coded packets but the destination
will fail to reconstruct the message within the given transmissions
bound. The second term evaluates the probability of the event that
the destination will recover the complete message after the nT-th
coded packet packet has been transmitted but the eavesdropper has
already recovered at least τ data packets by that time.
3.3 Resource Allocation Model
This section aims to determine the optimum values of power con-
trolled coefficients for minimizing the intercept probability while
supporting the legitimate destination to successfully reconstruct
the source message through a limited number of transmissions,
as discussed in Section 2. Using the theoretical formulation of
Pint(K,NT, τ, as, aj1 , ar), the optimum values of power control
coefficients can be obtained by
[a∗s , a∗j1 , a
∗
r ] = arg min
as,aj1 ,ar
Pint(K,NT, τ, as, aj1 , ar) (29)
subject to FD(K,NT) ≥ Pˆ , NT ≤ Nˆ (30)
0.5 < as ≤ 1, 0 < aj1 ≤ as, 0.5 < ar ≤ 1 (31)
where (30) ensures that the message recovery probability of des-
tination is at least Pˆ , and prevents the uncontrollable increase of
transmissions that is the number of intended coded packets is less
than or equal to Nˆ . Whereas (31) sets the suitable range of power
control coefficients. Given the challenging nature of the optimisa-
tion problem and the lack of closed-form solutions, the direct search
algorithm has been used and results are presented in Section 4. Note
that the direct search algorithm is an iterative method of finding a
globally optimal solution. In particular, instead of exploring all pos-
sible values of optimization parameters, the direct search algorithm
converges quickly because during each iteration it searches both
globally and locally. Once it finds the basin of convergence of the
optimum, the algorithm automatically starts searching locally to find
the optimum solution. A step-by-step description of the algorithm is
provided in [30].
4 Results and Discussion
This section presents simulation results and validates the accuracy of
the theoretical expressions. A Monte Carlo simulation platform rep-
resenting the system model was developed in MATLAB. Instances
where the eavesdropper successfully recovered at least τ data pack-
ets were counted and averaged over 105 realizations to compute
the intercept probability. The performance difference between the
communication scenario when the direct links between source to
destination and eavesdropper nodes are considered (which will be
referred as CC-D) and when the direct links between the source to
destination and eavesdropper nodes are not considered (which will
be referred as CC-WD) while setting εSD =εSE =1 is also high-
lighted. Note that, for CC-WD, we assume that the direct links
could be in deep shadowing or the destination and the eavesdrop-
per could be outside the coverage area of the source. Let the pair
{di,D, di,E} denote the distance of ith relay node from D and E.
The distance pairs in the simulation environment are configured as:
(2, 1.3), (2, 1), (3, 3), (2, 3), (3, 4), (1.5, 1), (1.5, 1.1), (2.3, 1.5).
Without loss of generality, both source S and destination D are
located at (0, 0) and (4, 0), respectively, and unless otherwise stated,
the eavesdropper is considered at location (3, 0). In addition, in all
the cases we consider Pˆ = 0.90, Nˆ = 3K, and path loss exponent
ηi,j=η=3. Moreover for illustration purposes, we assume that the
source employs convolutionally coded BPSK and the relay considers
un-coded BPSK for physical layer transmissions, which are charac-
terized by SNR thresholds γˆS = −0.983 dB and γˆR = 5.782 dB,
respectively [22]. The term ’SNR’ is used to refer to ρ = P/N0, as
defined in Section 2.
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Fig. 2: Performance comparison between CC-D and CC-WD, when
K = 15, τ = 11, q = 4.
Fig. 2 shows the intercept probability as a function of transmitted
SNR and the number of relays for both CC-D and CC-WD strate-
gies. The analytical curves match well the simulation results, which
confirms the correctness of our mathematical analysis. It can be
seen that the intercept probability of CC-D reduces with increasing
SNR, which opposes the conventional view that the intercept prob-
ability usually increases with the enhancement of SNR [31], [32].
This is due to the fact that the allocated power to interfering sig-
nals increases with SNR increasing, which effectively decreases the
received SINR at the eavesdropper. On the other hand, at medium to
high SNR regions, CC-WD follows the traditional pattern of inter-
cept probability. Interestingly, at the low SNR region, the intercept
probability of CC-WD reduces with the increase of SNR. This is
because the eavesdropper links are less resistant to artificial interfer-
ence at low SNR values, therefore optimal power allocation between
relay and jammer leads to improved secrecy performance. Note that,
because of the jamming effect, the intercept probability converges
to a constant value, which specifies that a level of security can
be offered even at high SNR values. It can also be noted that the
secrecy performance of both CC-D and CC-WD is also affected by
the number of relays N . Importantly, the performance gap between
CC-D and CC-WD increases for high values of N . One of the
intuitive reason is that CC-D exploits the diversity benefit of source-
to-destination link, and utilizes the relays in both the broadcast and
relay phase.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the impact of the number of data packets K
on the secrecy performance. It is apparent that the intercept probabil-
ity can be reduced by increasing the number of data packets K. This
implies that the network security can be improved if the message
to be transmitted is segmented into a larger number of shorter data
packets. This intrinsic feature of network coding offers a flexibility
in designing a physical layer security protocol, such that, it allows to
adjust the secrecy level that meets the application requirement.
Fig. 4 exhibits the intercept probability as a function of the eaves-
dropper’s position. The intercept probability increases when the
distance between E and S decreases. The secrecy is achieved even
when E is closer to S. But it is interesting to note that after a cer-
tain distance between S and E, the intercept probability decreases
sharply. This clearly indicates the importance of superposition of AN
IET Commun. pp. 1–7
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Fig. 3: Number of data packetsK versus intercept probability, when
τ/K = 0.7, q = 4.
0 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 2 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.7 5
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Fig. 4: Eavesdropper position versus the intercept probability, when
K = 15, τ = 11, N = 10, q = 16.
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Fig. 5: Intercept probability and decoding delay as a function of
Eavesdropper position and the finite field size q, when K = 20,
τ = 11, and N = 10.
with the information bearing signal. For example, at SNR = 15 dB
when E gets closer to S, the latter allocates more power to AN and
less power to the information bearing signal. After a certain position
of E (i.e., dx > 3), S allocates less power to AN and offers more help
to D in the accumulation of K linearly independent coded packets
quickly. The results reaffirm the fact that remarkable secrecy gain
can be achieved at high SNR values if power is optimally allocated
among signals.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of the field size q on both the intercept
probability and the delay performance in terms of the number of
coded packets transmissions for D to successfully decode the source
message. Clearly, the figure demonstrates that the intercept probabil-
ity significantly increases when the field size reduces from q = 16
to q = 2, and a comparatively low excess number of transmissions
are required for D to recover the message. The performance gap
increases with the increase of the distance between E and S. How-
ever, an increase in q also increases the overhead of RLNC and
the decoding complexity of Gaussian elimination [33]. This yields
a tradeoff between the complexity and the security performance.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined the network security in terms of τ -intercept
probability. The theoretical expressions match well with the simula-
tion results. A key feature of this work is that RLNC enabled source
transmissions leveraged the secrecy benefit of source-to-destination
link, where the source transmits both AN and message signals. It has
been demonstrated that the proposed framework can provide signifi-
cantly high secrecy gain at large SNR values. Moreover, the network
security can be further improved by increasing the number of relays
and the number of data packets over which RLNC is performed.
A Future direction on this topic could involve the use of machine
learning techniques for resource allocations in a multi-source multi-
relay network while considering the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers. Moreover, analysing the network performance correspond-
ing to secrecy diversity order would also be an interesting future
direction.
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